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IN MEMORIAL
On March 2, 2007 42-year-old 
Constable Daniel Tessier of the Laval 
Police Department was fatally shot 
during a drug bust in Brossard, Quebec. 
His partner Constable Stephane 
Forbes was wounded in the arm.
Constables Tessier and Forbes had 
been part of a large simultaneous 
crackdown on a drug-dealing 
network with search warrants out 
for eight locations, six in Laval and 
two in Brossard.
Constable Tessier had been 
assigned to the morality and drug squad only one week 
before his death. He had been a police officer for 15 
years.
Constable Tessier is survived by his 
wife, who also serves as a police 
constable, and two young daughters 
ages 10 and 12.
With the death of Constable Tessier, a total of 13 
police officers have lost their lives to gunfire over the 
past 10 years. Other officers killed by gunfire include:
2006 
  Constable Marc Bourdages
  July 16, 2006 
  RCMP Saskatchewan
  Constable Robin Cameron
  July 15, 2006 
  RCMP Saskatchewan
  Constable John Atkinson
  May 5, 2006
  Windsor Police Service Ontario 
 
2005 
 Constable Valerie Gignac
  December 14, 2005
  Laval Police Department
 
  Constable Anthony Gordon
  March 3, 2005
  RCMP Alberta
 
  Constable Lionide Johnston
  March 3, 2005
  RCMP Alberta
  Constable Brock Myrol
  March 3, 2005
  RCMP Alberta
 Constable Peter Schiemann
  March 3, 2005
  RCMP Alberta
2004 
  Corporal James Galloway
  February 28, 2004
  RCMP Alberta
2002 
  Constable Benoit L’Ecuyer
  February 28, 2002
  Montreal Police Service
 
2001 
   Constable Dennis Strongquill
   December 21, 2001 
   RCMP Manitoba
   Constable Jurgen Seewald
   March 5, 2001
   RCMP Nunavut
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page, available at 
www.odmp.org/canada
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“Want to say I 
appreciate getting 
these 10-8 newsletters 
...  Some of your info has been very 
helpful to me and some MP training 
that I have done in Use of Force and related topics.  
Especially helpful was some of your handcuffing 
articles, such as Justifying Wrist Restraints. Keep up 
the good work!” - Military Police Sergeant, Ontario
*********
“Thanks tons and keep up the excellent, 
essential work!” - Police Staff 
Sergeant, Ontario
*********
“I have read your in service :10-8 "A 
Peer Read Publication" and quite enjoy 
the information provided for operational 
purposes as well as keeping current with the justice 
system and its case law(s) ... I request to  be added on 
your list for its publication in the future. Thanks in 
advance.” - Police Officer, Ontario
*********
“Was hoping you could add me to your 
10-8 letter list. I’ve been [a police 
officer] for just over 5 1/2 years, and as 
scary as it sounds I have 40% of the department 
junior to me. This seems to be a reality in today’s 
policing. The new guys have been drilling me with all 
kinds of questions, especially search and seizure. I had 
a friend pass on the web site and it has been very 
helpful.  The information, especially forming grounds 
and articulation, is phenomenal. I would be grateful if 
you would add me to your list.” - Police Constable, 
Alberta
*********
“I just received a copy of 10-8 through 
a bulk e-mail at my station. It's nice to 
see that someone has had the foresight 
to compile some of the most significant case laws that 
affect how we do our jobs on a daily basis. Could you 
add me to your list please?” - Police Officer, Ontario
*********
“Can you please add me to the electronic 
distribution list.  It will keep me from 
stealing them from work and reading 
them at home.” - Police Constable, British Columbia
www.10-8.ca
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“I have periodically received your 
newsletter and on every occasion have 
found the information to be well laid out 
and pertinent to our profession.  I would like to be 
added to your email distribution list so I can receive 
this newsletter on a regular basis.  Keep up the good 
work!  - Police Constable, Manitoba
*********
“I just read 10-8 for the first time. I 
must say that I’m quite impressed and 
would like to become a subscriber.” - 
Police Corporal, British Columbia 
*********
“Both myself and my fellow sergeant ... use 
your newsletter in our briefings to quiz our 
members on points of case law. As you 
know policing is changing constantly and it is the police 
officer’s responsibility to keep up with changes so that 
we can do our job effectively. Thank you for your 
publication. I find it a very valuable tool to stay fresh 
and current in case law .” - Police Sergeant, New 
Brunswick
*********
“I find the case law examples you give 
much easier to understand and make it 
easier to articulate myself properly in 
court.” - Police Constable, British Columbia
*********
“I was wondering if you would be able to 
add me to your e-mail list for the In-
Service Newsletter. I find many of the 
case laws you publish directly reflect some of the 
scenarios and investigations that we experience in our 
unit and the continual electronic update would be an 
asset” - Police Sergeant, Manitoba
*********
“Can you please put me on your e-mail 
distribution list. Your articles are great 
and help to any police officer wanting to 
stay current on the ever changing case law” - Police 
Constable, British Columbia
*********
“Please sign me up for the 10-8 newsletter 
...The information I have been able to 
source off of the open internet is great, 
and it is nice to have case law spelled out in layman’s 
terms like it is in the newsletter publication.  Thank 
you.” - Police Constable, British Columbia
IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge 
your understanding of the 
law. Each question is based on an article featured in this 
issue. See page 21 for the answers.
1. Which RCMP rank is highest?
 (a) Assistant Commissioner
 (b) Deputy Commissioner
2. The police must provide  a s.10(b) right to counsel 
Charter warning immediately at the outset of every 
investigative detention.
 (a) True
 (b) False
3. The right to counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter is 
not triggered when police question a subject unless 
that person is arrested or detained.
 (a) True
 (b) False
4. When the police deliberately interrogate a suspect 
without recording it when video equipment is 
available, some courts are holding that the  
voluntariness of the statement is suspect.
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. Which of the following was the greatest cause of 
death in British Columbia in 2005?
 (a) homicide
 (b) drug induced
 (c) motor vehicle accidents
 (d) suicide
6. When searching as an incident to arrest, the police 
must suspend their search until the arrestee has had 
the opportunity to retain counsel.
 (a) True
 (b) False
Note-able Quote
“The best executive is the one who has sense enough 
to pick good men to do what he wants done, and self-
restraint to keep from meddling with them while they 
do it”.—Theodore Roosevelt
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BRIEF INTERLUDE BETWEEN 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION & 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL OK
R. v. Suberu, 2007 ONCA 60
Police were called to a Liquor Control 
Board of Ontario (LCBO) store where a 
man was attempting to purchase a $3 
bottle of beer using a $100 LCBO gift 
certificate obtained earlier that day in another 
town using a stolen credit card. An employee tried 
to stall the man until police arrived. The accused 
approached the employee and asked what was taking 
so long. As police arrived one officer spoke to the 
other man while a second officer accosted the 
accused as he walked towards the exit. The accused 
said, “He did this, not me, so I guess I can go.”
The officer followed the accused out of the store 
and detained him as he started to get into the 
driver’s seat of a vehicle located in the parking lot. 
The officer said, “Wait a minute. I need to talk to 
you before you go anywhere.” The officer then had 
a brief conversation with the accused where he was 
asked a series of questions, including who the male 
inside the store was, where he was from, and who 
owned the van. At the time however, the accused 
was not advised of his right to counsel under s.10(b) 
of the Charter.
The officer was then advised by police radio that 
two suspects had purchased the gift certificates 
using a stolen credit card.  A vehicle description and 
licence plate number was also provided which 
matched the accused’s vehicle.  The officer asked 
the accused for identification and vehicle ownership 
papers. While the accused retrieved the documents 
the officer saw an LCBO bag containing liquor, Wal-
Mart bags, and several boxes with new merchandise 
behind the front seat. The accused was arrested for 
fraud, but interrupted the officer and said it wasn’t 
him, but his friend. When asked who owned “all the 
stuff” in the van, the accused said some of the 
property was his and some belonged to the male in 
the store. The accused was again arrested for fraud 
and advised of his right to counsel. The van was 
searched and police found a black purse with 
information pertaining to the owner of the stolen 
credit and debit cards. 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the officer 
detaining the accused said he did so because he was 
not sure whether the accused was involved in 
incident nor the extent of his involvement if he was. 
The officer explained his purpose for questioning 
was to look into what was going on. The trial judge 
concluded that the circumstances of this case 
involved a “momentary investigative detention” and 
the officer’s questions were “introductory and 
preliminary” and asked “merely to determine if their 
was any involvement” by the accused. The trial judge 
determined that the accused’s right to counsel 
under s.10(b) was not triggered. He was convicted of 
possession of a credit card obtained by crime and 
two counts of possession of property obtained by 
crime under $5000. The accused’s appeal to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice was dismissed. 
The Superior Court Justice was not convinced the 
trial judge erred in his legal analysis.  The accused 
then appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal.
Justice Doherty, writing the unanimous Ontario 
Court of Appeal decision, first examined the 
application of s.10(b) to investigative detentions. He 
said:
All persons who are detained by the police must 
be advised of their right to counsel without 
delay. … If a detained person chooses to exercise 
his or her right to counsel, that person must be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to contact and 
speak with counsel in private.   The police must 
refrain from questioning the detainee until the 
detainee has availed him or herself of that 
reasonable opportunity…
Police officers are authorized to detain persons 
for investigative purposes where there is a clear 
nexus between that individual and a recent or 
ongoing criminal offence.   In addition to that 
nexus, the detention for investigative purposes 
must be a reasonable detention based on all of the 
circumstances and must be conducted in a 
reasonable manner.   Investigative concerns will 
usually justify only a brief detention following 
which the officer will either have to release the 
individual or, if reasonable and probable grounds 
exist, arrest the individual.   Investigative 
detention is not an arrest and cannot be treated 
as a de facto arrest by the police or by the courts…
There is an obvious tension between the 
requirement to inform detained persons of their 
www.10-8.ca
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detention and to assist them with regaining their 
liberty as quickly as possible. In examining these two 
purposes, Justice Doherty wrote:
The first of these two purposes – to advise 
detained persons of their rights – is operative in 
the context of a routine investigative detention.  
Persons who are detained for investigative 
purposes are usually questioned.  Often, questions 
asked in the context of a routine investigative 
detention, even exploratory questions like those 
asked by [the officer in this case], may have an 
incriminatory potential.  Access to legal advice in 
the course of an investigatory detention would 
give the detainee some protection against the risk 
of self-incrimination.   That protection would, 
however, come with a significant cost.
The second purpose underlying the obligation to 
advise detained persons of the their right to 
counsel – to assist those persons in regaining their 
liberty – will often not be served by requiring that 
individuals subject to brief investigative 
detentions be advised of their right to counsel.  
To the contrary, as indicated above, a person who 
is under investigative detention and who after 
being advised of his or her right to counsel 
chooses to exercise that right, will almost 
inevitably end up suffering a longer detention and 
more intrusive state conduct than he or she would 
otherwise have endured.  [Justice Iacobucci] in R. 
v. Mann…recognized the potential negative impact 
on the detained person’s liberty when he 
cautioned against using s. 10(b) to artificially 
prolong investigative detentions. [paras. 44-45]
Justice Doherty then looked at the words “without 
delay” as they are used in s.10(b) of the Charter and 
ruled that the police can wait a short time—or take 
a brief interlude—between the beginning of an 
investigative detention and advising the detainee of 
their right to counsel. During this interlude, the 
officer can make a quick assessment of the situation 
to determine whether anything more than a brief 
detention may be warranted. He said:
A proper interpretation of s. 10(b) in the context 
of investigative detentions must bear in mind not 
only the purposes underlying s. 10(b), but the 
practical realities of the nature, length, and 
purpose of investigative detentions.  I think the 
phrase “without delay” takes on significance in 
the context of investigative detentions. 
right to counsel and the proper and effective use 
of brief investigative detentions.   Not only will 
most investigative detentions justify only a brief 
detention of the individual, most will occur “on the 
street” in dynamic and quickly evolving situations.  
The police must move quickly in these situations 
to react to the circumstances as they change and 
to new information as it becomes available.  If the 
police are obliged to advise every person detained 
for investigative purposes of their right to 
counsel before asking any potentially incriminating 
questions, the police are presumably required to 
stop any questioning and facilitate contact with 
counsel if the detained person chooses to 
exercise his or her right to counsel.   The delay 
inherent in this process, not to mention the 
redirection of police resources that would be 
required to comply with requests to consult with 
counsel, would render the police power to briefly 
detain persons for investigative purposes in aid of 
criminal investigations largely illusory.
In addition to the negative impact on the ability 
of the police to effectively investigate crimes, a 
requirement that the police advise detained 
persons of the right to counsel immediately could 
seriously impair the liberty interests of detained 
persons.   If the police are required to advise a 
person detained briefly for investigative purposes 
of his or her right to counsel before asking any 
questions and if the person exercises that right, 
the detention of that person will potentially be 
considerably longer than it would otherwise have 
been.  The police may also be required to take the 
person into physical custody to transport that 
person to another location where he or she can 
effectively exercise the right to counsel.  These 
lengthier detentions, accompanied in some cases 
by transportation to another location while in 
physical custody, could also necessitate personal 
searches of the detained persons that would not 
be appropriate in the context of a brief 
investigative detention.  The interpretation of s. 
10(b) urged by counsel for the [accused] in the 
context of brief investigative detentions would 
inevitably result in significant additional 
interference with the liberty and personal 
security of those detained for investigative 
purposes. [paras. 39-42, references omitted]
Justice Doherty then went on to review the two 
purposes served by the police advising a detainee of 
the right to counsel;  providing them with an 
opportunity to get legal advice (eg. right against 
self-incrimination, right to silence) while under 
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The words “without delay” have been construed in 
the context of detentions following arrest as 
meaning “immediately… When the detained person 
is arrested, only legitimate police safety concerns 
or similar exigencies can justify any delay in 
advising the arrested person of his or her rights 
under s. 10(b) of the Charter. 
Considered in the context of an arrest, a 
restrictive reading of the words “without delay” 
in s. 10(b) is fully justified by a purposive 
interpretation of the section.   Detention during 
an arrest will include physical restraint, a 
personal search, and will usually involve moving the 
detainee to a jail.  That detention will not be brief 
and will significantly interfere with the detainee’s 
liberty and security of the 
person. Advising an arrested 
person of his or her right to 
counsel will not usually 
prolong the detention. An 
arrested person is also 
obviously in need of 
immediate advice as to his 
or her rights while in 
detention.  The concern that 
detained persons should 
have access to legal advice 
about their rights and the 
concern of minimizing 
interference with the 
liberty of detained persons 
are both promoted by 
advising arrested persons of 
the right to counsel 
immediately upon arrest. 
The phrase “without delay” 
in s. 10(b) has, however, been read somewhat 
more broadly in respect of detentions other than 
arrests. …
In my view, a brief interlude between the 
commencement of an investigative detention and 
the advising of the detained person’s right to 
counsel under s. 10(b) during which the officer 
makes a quick assessment of the situation to 
decide whether anything more than a brief 
detention of the individual may be warranted, is 
not inconsistent with the requirement that a 
detained person be advised of his or her right to 
counsel “without delay”…
Acknowledging that there can be a brief time 
span between an initial detention for investigative 
purposes and the administration of the s. 10(b) 
rights also reflects the nature of the vast 
majority of investigative detentions.   Like the 
detention in this case, most investigative 
detentions are the result of “psychological 
compulsion” and not physical restraint.  It is often 
difficult to tell exactly when in the course of a 
dynamic interchange between the police and an 
individual that a detention based on psychological 
compulsion begins.  In some cases, the nature of 
the questions put to the person by the officer and 
that person’s responses to those questions will be 
relevant in determining whether there was a 
psychological detention… It seems highly 
artificial to select an arbitrary point in what is a 
fluid encounter and declare that from that point 
forward the person was 
detained and the next 
words out of the officer’s 
mouth should have been 
advice as to the person’s 
right to counsel.
Finally, and again most 
importantly, I see nothing 
in the phrase “without 
delay” which precludes the 
interpretation I would 
place on s. 10(b) insofar as 
investigative detentions 
are concerned.  The words 
“without delay” are 
semantically capable of a 
broader meaning than 
“immediately” in the 
appropriate context…
In interpreting the words 
“without delay” somewhat 
more expansively in the context of investigative 
detentions than in the context of arrest, I do not 
mean to read s. 10(b) out of police/citizen 
encounters that do not progress past the 
investigative detention stage.   The time limit 
imposed by the words “without delay” is of 
necessity a tight one and can accommodate only 
brief interludes between commencing an 
investigative detention and advising the detained 
person of his or her right to counsel.
The police activity during the brief interlude 
contemplated by the words “without delay” must 
be truly exploratory in that the officer must be 
trying to decide whether anything beyond a brief 
detention of the person will be necessary and 
justified.  If the officer has already made up his 
“In summary, … s.10(b) applies to … 
detentions for investigative purposes.  
However, in deciding whether there has 
been compliance with s.10(b) in the 
context of a brief investigative detention, 
the phrase “without delay” should be 
read so as to countenance some brief 
interlude between commencing a 
detention and advising the detained 
person of his or her right to counsel.  
During that brief interlude, the police 
may take appropriate steps to make a 
quick assessment of whether anything 
beyond the brief investigative detention” 
www.10-8.ca
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sniffed the accused’s backpack. The accused pulled 
the backpack away, but the dog pursued it, and then 
sat indicating he had detected an odour of narcotic. 
Another officer then approached the accused, 
identified himself, and asked him if he wouldn’t mind 
speaking to him. The officer told him he had done 
nothing wrong and was not under arrest. The accused 
identified himself and answered a few questions. 
During this time it was learned the accused had a 
prior drug related record with a notation of violence. 
At that point the officer arrested the accused for 
possession of narcotics. He was advised of his 
Charter rights and said he wanted to speak to a 
lawyer. 
The accused’s backpack was then opened and cocaine 
and a set of electronic scales was found. He was then 
re-arrested for possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. He was again advised of his right to 
counsel and asked if he wanted to talk to a lawyer, 
but was told there was no way to give him privacy at 
the railway station so he could have privacy at the 
police station, a few minutes away.
At trial in Nova Scotia Supreme Court on charges of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking 
and trafficking in cocaine the accused argued he had 
been arbitrarily detained (s.9 Charter), denied his 
right to counsel (s.10(b) Charter) and subjected to 
an unreasonable search (s.8 Charter). The trial 
judge, however, ruled that he had not been 
arbitrarily detained prior to arrest, which was based 
on reasonable grounds, and the search that followed 
was justified as an incident to arrest. The judge also 
found the accused’s right to counsel had not been 
violated. He was convicted of possession for the 
purpose of trafficking, but then appealed to the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. 
Detention?
The trial judge concluded the accused had not been 
detained prior to his arrest because he was not 
physically constrained nor was he given a direction or 
demand that may have had legal consequences. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence the accused had 
a reasonable perception he had no choice but to 
comply with police. Rather, the officer was not 
threatening in any objective sense. Justice Fichaud, 
authoring the unanimous judgment, found the trial 
or her mind that the detained person will be 
detained for something more than a brief 
interval, there is no justification for not providing 
the individual with his or her right to counsel 
immediately… [paras. 46-54, references omitted]
And further:
In summary, … s. 10(b) applies to … detentions for 
investigative purposes.   However, in deciding 
whether there has been compliance with s. 10(b) 
in the context of a brief investigative detention, 
the phrase “without delay” should be read so as to 
countenance some brief interlude between 
commencing a detention and advising the detained 
person of his or her right to counsel.  During that 
brief interlude, the police may take appropriate 
steps to make a quick assessment of whether 
anything beyond the brief investigative detention 
of the individual may be warranted.  [para. 63, 
reference omitted]
Since there was no s.10(b) breach it was 
unnecessary to consider s.24(2). The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
POLICE QUESTIONING DOES 
NOT NECESSARILY TRIGGER 
DETENTION
R. v. Lewis, 2007 NSCA 2
The accused was the last person to 
disembark a Via Rail sleeper car when 
he was seen by plainclothes members of 
a Jetway Unit. A Jetway Unit is a 
criminal interdiction team that monitors passengers 
at airports, train stations, and bus depots for the 
purpose of mainly intercepting illegal contraband 
such as drugs. After spotting travellers exhibiting 
nervous or avoiding behaviour, officers approach 
them, identify themselves and enter into 
conversation. The traveller is arrested if proper 
grounds form and a search is conducted. A police 
dog, trained in narcotic detection, may be used to 
sniff the traveller’s baggage. 
A dog handler, who was waiting in a reception area, 
was signalled to approach the accused with his drug 
sniffing dog, a yellow Labrador. As the officer 
followed the accused with his dog on a leash, the dog 
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Finally, the accused contended that his arrest was 
illegal because the grounds used to support it 
included information about his drug record that was 
obtained during police questioning and before he was 
advised of his right to counsel. Although a search 
incident to an illegal arrest is itself illegal, the 
accused’s arrest in this case was lawful. The arrest 
was based on reasonable grounds-the detection by a 
drug dog of a narcotic in the backpack of someone 
with a drug record. The accused was not under 
detention when he identified himself to police during 
conversation and the police were entitled to use the 
identification to check his record. Since there was 
no detention, there was no requirement that the 
police inform the accused of his right to counsel 
under s.10(b) before learning he had a drug record.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Search Incident to Arrest
“The right to search incident to arrest 
derives from the fact of arrest or detention 
of the person.   The right to retain and 
instruct counsel derives from the arrest or 
detention, not from the fact of being 
searched.  Therefore immediately upon 
detention, the detainee does have the right to be informed 
of the right to retain and instruct counsel. However, the 
police are not obligated to suspend the search incident to 
arrest until the detainee has the opportunity to retain 
counsel.”-Justice Lamer, R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140
BREATHALYSER OPERATOR NEED 
NOT SPEAK TO LAWYER BEFORE 
LAWYER SPEAKS TO CLIENT
R. v. Fitzsimmons, 
(2006) Docket:C44435 (OntCA)
After failing a roadside screening 
device the accused was arrested for 
impaired driving, read his Charter 
rights, cautioned, and given the 
breath demand. At the police station he was handed 
over to the qualified technician who again reiterated 
judge did not err in holding there was no physical 
constraint, no demand or direction, and no 
reasonable perception of compulsion. The accused 
did not testify as to how he perceived the situation. 
Even though a court can infer a detention from the 
circumstances without an accused’s testimony, there 
is no legal presumption that a detention occurs 
simply because a police officer conducts an 
interview. 
Access to Counsel
The trial judge held that it was impractical to give 
the accused access to counsel on a public pay phone 
at the railway station because it would not provide 
privacy. He was then transported almost 
immediately to the police station and provided a 
phone to use and was not subject to any form of 
interrogation between the time of arrest and his 
lawyer call. Justice Fichaud again concluded the trial 
judge did not err in finding the accused’s right to a 
reasonable opportunity to consult counsel without 
delay was respected. 
The accused also argued that the police should have 
not searched him after his arrest until he had the 
opportunity to consult counsel. He submitted this 
violated his right to counsel in that the police have a 
duty to suspend obtaining incriminating evidence 
until the detainee has had the opportunity to consult 
counsel. Justice Fichaud disagreed. Although the 
police have the right to be informed of the right to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay on arrest, 
the police do not have to suspend the search incident 
to arrest until the detainee has had the opportunity 
to retain counsel.  
The Search
The accused argued the search of his backpack was 
not incidental to arrest, but rather incidental to his 
detention and part of a strategy to develop grounds 
for the arrest and search of a Jetway targeted 
individual. In rejecting this submission, Justice 
Fichaud held:
[The accused] was arrested for possession of a 
narcotic. The search was for the purpose of 
locating the narcotic - ie. discovery of evidence 
that may be used at [his] trial. This was a search 
incidental to arrest… It was not a search for an 
unrelated purpose. [references omitted, para. 39]
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the accused’s right to counsel. He requested counsel 
and the technician contacted a lawyer for him. The 
lawyer asked the technician questions about the 
incident, including why the accused had been 
stopped and whether there was an accident. The 
technician, however, refused to talk about the 
investigation and told the lawyer he was not the 
arresting officer. The lawyer then told the 
technician that he could not give proper legal advice 
without knowing the reasons and grounds for the 
stop. The technician refused to answer. The accused 
then spoke to the lawyer in private.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused 
argued his rights under the Charter were breached 
because, in part, the police failed to facilitate his 
right to retain and instruct counsel by not assisting 
his lawyer. The lawyer testified that the advice he 
gave to the accused was based on information 
provided by the accused, rather than information he 
wanted to get about what was in the mind of the 
officer. Furthermore, the lawyer also said the time 
of the incident was important to the advice he had 
to give. Finally, the accused stated he did not feel 
he received complete advice about whether or not 
he had to give a breath sample. The application to 
exclude the evidence was dismissed and the accused 
was convicted of over 80mg%.
The accused successfully appealed to the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice. The appeal court judge 
ruled that the answers sought from the technician 
by the lawyer were not an onerous burden and the 
failure to provide this information unduly limited the 
accused’s right to counsel. In her view, the evidence 
did not establish that the accused possessed all the 
necessary facts to permit the lawyer to assess 
whether the police had the required reasonable and 
probable grounds to demand a breath sample. A new 
trial was ordered.
The Crown then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. Justice Weiler, authoring the unanimous 
decision, found the burden was on the accused to 
prove on a balance of probabilities that he was not 
able to exercise his s.10(b) rights in a meaningful 
way. The burden was not on the Crown to prove the 
accused had all the information required by legal 
counsel to provide him with the necessary advice. In 
this case, the accused’s right to counsel was not 
breached when the breathalyser operator refused 
to speak to the accused’s lawyer before the lawyer 
spoke to his client. Justice Weiler stated:
Upon arrest the police have an obligation to 
provide the detainee with the reason for his 
arrest, advise him of the right to counsel, and to 
provide him with an opportunity to exercise that 
right.  In this case, instead of consulting with his 
client, counsel for the detainee insisted on 
speaking to the breathalyser technician first and 
the technician’s refusal to answer counsel’s 
questions formed the basis of the alleged 
infringement of [the accused’s] Charter rights.  
Further, although counsel claimed that he needed 
the information from the breathalyser technician 
in order to properly advise his client, he did not 
seek to obtain this same information from his 
client.
Counsel’s obligation was to first consult with his 
client, the detainee, and to ask him what he 
needed to know in order to advise him.  This he did 
not do… [paras. 17-18]
And further:
The fundamental purpose of s. 10(b) is to ensure 
that detainees are sufficiently informed of their 
jeopardy and their right to counsel and are given 
a reasonable opportunity to exercise that right. 
[The breathalyser operator] was under no 
obligation to answer [the lawyer’s] questions 
before [the lawyer] spoke to [the accused]. 
Indeed to place such an obligation on a 
breathalyser operator is impractical and could 
seriously interfere with the officer’s ability to 
carry out his duties not only with respect to this 
detainee but others as well.  We are not satisfied 
that there was any information necessary to the 
giving of legal advice that counsel could not have 
obtained by other means such as by asking his 
client. [para. 24]
Justice Weiler did caution however, that she was 
not addressing the question of whether the police 
have an obligation to provide a lawyer with 
information they cannot obtain from the detainee. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the order of a new 
trial was set aside, and the conviction of over 
80mg% was restored. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
www.10-8.ca10
Volume 7 Issue 2
March/April 2007
BC DEATHS
The British Columbia Vital Statistics 
Agency recently released its 2005 
Annual Report. The report is 
based on information collected 
for events, such as deaths, in the 
2005 calendar year. 
Report Fast Facts
• Unintentional injuries were the leading cause of 
death for people aged 15-24 years old and 25-
44 years old
• Of the 223 deaths of 15-24 year olds, 92 
resulted from unintentional injuries and 34 from 
suicide
• Suicide was the second leading cause of death 
for people aged 15-24 and the third leading 
cause of death for people 25-44 years old
• 1,605 people died from external causes of 
death, such as motor vehicle accidents, 
poisonings, falls, suicide, and fire
Deaths by Motor Vehicle Accident 
• 369 people died from motor vehicle accidents
• Deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents 
included:
  58 pedestrians (35 male / 23 female)
 36 motorcycle riders (33 male / 3 
female)
 164 occupants of cars (92 male / 72 
female)
 51 occupants of pick-up trucks or vans 
(40 male / 11 female)
Deaths by Suicide
• 403 people died from suicide
• Deaths caused by suicide included:
 154 by hanging, strangulation, or 
suffocation (119 male / 35 female)
 76 by drugs, medicaments, or biological 
substances (37 male / 39 female)
 34 by gases and vapours (29 male / 5 female)
 24 by jumping from a high place (15 male / 9 
female)
Deaths by Homicide
•  31 people died from homicide
Deaths by Alcohol
• There were 1,878 alcohol-related deaths
• 362 deaths were directly related to alcohol and 
another 1,516 were indirectly related to alcohol
• Of the 1,878 deaths, 1,432 were male and 446 
were female
Motor Vehicle Accident Deaths (2005)
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Deaths by Drugs
• There were 342 drug-induced deaths, including 
illicit and prescribed drugs (229 male / 113 
female)
• Drug induced deaths included
 66.7% accidental poisoning
 22.8 % suicide 
 6.7 % drug use / abuse
• 179 deaths were unintentional illicit / illegal 
overdoses
The complete Vital Statistics 2005 Annual Report is available at 
www.vs.gov.bc.ca
BC METH DEATHS DOWN
The British Columbia Coroner’s Service 
released its methamphetamine (meth) 
death statistics for 2006. In the April 
2007 report, 16 people who died in 2006 
had meth present in their bodies, half the 
total for the previous year. Of those 16 deaths, only 
two had meth alone listed as the drug leading to death. 
Five deaths occurred where meth was identified as 
contributing to death, and two deaths involved meth and 
one or more other drugs. In three deaths meth was 
present but ruled not relevant to the death while four 
deaths were still under investigation. The complete 
report is available at www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/coroners.
Deaths: Methamphetamine Present
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Second, the Supreme Court’s judgment involving the 
use of statements made under statutory compulsion 
in response to provincial traffic legislation did not 
assist the accused. In that case, the court examined 
four contextual factors in deciding whether the 
statement was admissible; (1) the existence of 
coercion, (2) an adversarial relationship, (3) the real 
possibility of an unreliable confession to a person in 
authority, and (4) abuse of power. Even if these 
criteria were applied to this case, there was no 
violation of the principles of fundamental justice. 
There was little, if any coercion. The accused was 
not under pronounced psychological and emotional 
pressure, and there was no abuse of power. He was 
not threatened or intimidated, but rather presented 
with an opportunity to obtain employment in a 
criminal organization.
Finally, the accused’s right to silence was not 
violated. Section 7 does not apply to undercover 
operations prior to detention. Nor was the accused 
in circumstances that could be considered the 
functional equivalent of a detention and equally 
needing protection from the greater power of the 
state. He chose to speak to the undercover officers 
and “was not under the control of the state nor was 
the context such as to require that he be protected 
from the greater power of the state.” 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
convictions upheld.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
MR. BIG SCENARIO DID NOT 
BREACH s.7 CHARTER
R. v. Osmar, 2007 ONCA 50
Following the murder of two men about 
one month apart, the accused became 
a suspect and was surveilled for 
several months but police were unable 
to obtain any incriminating evidence. Police 
subsequently planned an undercover operation. An 
undercover officer befriended the accused at a drug 
treatment centre and had several more contacts 
with him over a period of five months. During this 
time the undercover officer introduced the accused 
to his “boss”, also an undercover officer. During 
their subsequent liaisons the accused told the “boss” 
he had killed the two men. This admission was 
surreptitiously audio taped and the accused was 
arrested and charged with two counts of first 
degree murder. At trial in the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice the accused was convicted.
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the statements he made 
to the undercover police officers should not have 
been admitted because his right against self-
incrimination protected by s.7 of the Charter had 
been violated. He submitted that s.7 is implicated 
whenever the state seeks to use self-incriminating 
evidence by coercive means. He contended that the 
trickery the police used in this case combined with 
elicitation amounted to coercion and there is no 
requirement that an accused be detained in order to 
trigger s.7.
Justice Rosenberg, authoring the unanimous Ontario 
Court of Appeal decision, rejected the accused’s 
appeal. Section 7 of the Charter is not infringed by 
undercover police operations where the suspect is 
not detained. First, the common law confessions rule, 
which also serves the principle against self 
incrimination, requires the Crown to prove that a 
statement is voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This rule however, only applies to statements made 
by an accused to a person they believe to be a person 
in authority, such as a police officer. Concerns about 
the reliability of confessions to private individuals 
can be addressed by appropriate jury instructions 
warning that such statements might be untrue or 
unreliable and given little weight. 
WHO IS MR. BIG?
“The police resort to this technique when they have 
a suspect in a serious crime, usually murder, but they 
have been unable to obtain sufficient evidence 
against the suspect.  While there are some variations, 
in general, in the Mr. Big scenario police officers 
posing as organized crime figures offer the suspect 
the opportunity to join their organization.  The cost of 
entry to the organization is that the suspect 
demonstrate that he can be trusted and is capable 
of carrying out the kind of criminal acts required by 
the organization.   The suspect is persuaded by 
inducements and other means to admit to a serious  
crime to demonstrate his trust in the organization and 
that he can be counted on to carry out the criminal  
orders of Mr. Big”- Justice Rosenberg, R. v. Osmar
www.10-8.ca
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him if he wanted to speak to a lawyer.  The accused 
said no.  In the course of the interview, the accused 
confessed to the offence.  
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused testified that the detective spent the first 
interview feeding him the version of events that the 
detective wanted in a videotaped interview.  He also 
alleged that during the second interview the other 
detective had made intimidating statements to him 
along the lines of, “I wish I had been there when you 
were arrested.” He testified that he had not been 
telling the truth and said that he was so scared that 
he would have said anything to get out of the room 
and that he had not given the interview of his own 
free will.  He also said he was told that he could go 
home if he confessed, but this was denied by the 
detective. 
The trial judge ruled that both the videotaped 
statement and a transcript of it were admissible as 
evidence.   He held that the accused had been 
informed of his right to counsel a number of times, 
and that on the videotape he did not display any sign 
of fear. The accused was found guilty of robbery, 
aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon. 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in holding that 
his statements were voluntary and that his rights 
under s.10(b) were not violated.  
Voluntariness
Even though a statement has been ultimately 
videotaped, it could still be rendered involuntary. 
The Court stated:
In order to properly determine 
voluntariness, the trial judge was 
obliged to consider what 
preceded the taped statements.  
He ought to have found the 
untaped portion of the interviews 
suspect and gone on to do an 
analysis of whether there was a 
sufficient record of the untaped 
portion to be able to rule on the 
voluntariness of the taped 
portion…   The [accused] was in 
custody; video equipment was 
available and the police 
deliberately set out to interrogate him without 
VOLUNTARINESS QUESTIONED 
IN UNRECORDED INTERVIEWS 
R. v. Philogene, 
(2006) Docket:C43401 (OntCA)
Following the stabbing and robbery of 
a woman, the accused was 
subsequently located by a police 
tracking dog, arrested, placed in the 
back of a police car, and advised of his right to 
counsel.  The accused said he understood his rights 
and wanted to call a lawyer when he got to the police 
station.   At the station, the officer-in-charge was 
told that the accused wanted to call a lawyer at the 
earliest convenience.  The officer-in-charge told him  
he could use the telephone to contact a lawyer and 
asked him if he understood.  The accused replied in 
the affirmative.
Without being provided the opportunity to call a 
lawyer, the accused was placed in an interview room 
and was interviewed by a detective for 10 minutes, 
which was not recorded on video.  A second interview 
involving another detective, accompanied by two 
other officers, took less than five minutes, but was 
not video recorded either. During a third interview 
the first detective returned to the interview room 
and asked if the accused had been read his rights to 
counsel and his caution, and the accused replied that 
he had and that he understood.  The detective asked 
him if he wanted to speak with a lawyer, and he 
answered “no.”  No one had told the detective that 
the accused had indicated that he wished to call 
counsel at the station, nor did the detective believe 
that any opportunity had been provided to call 
counsel while he was waiting in the interview room.  
The detective proceeded to talk 
to the accused about the incident 
in a non-videotaped interview.  
During this 15 minute interview, 
the accused stated that the 
weapon used was not a knife but 
a bottle.   A fourth interview, 
which lasted 23 minutes, was 
videotaped.  At the outset of the 
videotaped interview, the 
detective informed the accused 
of his right to counsel and asked 
“The [accused] was in custody; 
video equipment was available 
and the police deliberately set 
out to interrogate him without 
taping.  The resulting 
interrogation was thus 
rendered suspect by the fact 
that it was not recorded.”
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taping.   The resulting interrogation was thus 
rendered suspect by the fact that it was not 
recorded.   The trial judge failed to take these 
factors into account as part of his reasoning on the 
question of the voluntariness of the taped 
statement.
The circumstances prior to the taped interview 
are rendered even more suspect by the fact that 
at trial [the detective] admitted to making his 
notes after the interrogation; that his notes were 
selective, not exhaustive; and that they contained 
inaccuracies.   On the voir-dire, [the detective] 
testified that it was impossible for him to stay on 
top of the conversation and make notes and that 
was why the notes were only a summary of portions 
of the conversation.   At trial, [the detective] 
admitted that his notes of the unrecorded 
10:35  p.m. interrogation were after-the-fact 
summaries. [references omitted, paras. 13-14]
Here, the accused alleged that both fear of 
prejudice and hope of advantage had been held out 
to him by different police officers.  The trial judge 
did not deal with the issue of inducement.   In 
rejecting the accused’s evidence of intimidation 
and/or inducements to confess, the trial judge did 
not subject the detective’s reasons for not 
videotaping the pre-statement interrogations to the 
same level of scrutiny that he applied to the 
accused’s testimony. 
Right to Counsel
The accused’s s.  10(b) rights were violated. The 
accused told the arresting officer that he wished to 
speak to a lawyer when he arrived at the station and 
this wish was communicated to the officer in charge 
by the arresting officer. However, he was not 
provided with access to a telephone in the hour and 
thirty-five minutes that he was detained in an 
interview room before he said he didn’t want to 
speak to a lawyer and was interviewed by the 
detective. The Court stated:
The duty to facilitate contact with counsel 
requires the police to offer to use of the 
telephone…The fact that the breach of the 
[accused’s] right to counsel involved the 
implementational aspect of the right as opposed 
to the informational aspect still resulted in the 
infringement of the [accused’s] s.  10(b) rights.  
This is not a situation of the [accused] failing to 
be diligent in the exercise of his right to counsel; 
he was never given the opportunity to be diligent 
in exercising that right prior to the breach of his 
right to counsel. 
We do not propose to enter into speculation as to 
whether the [accused] would have given his 
statements had there been compliance with the 
implementational component of his rights.   The 
accused was treated unfairly while he was in 
custody and the admission of his videotaped 
statement would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute.   His statements should 
have been excluded pursuant to s.  24(2) of the 
Charter.  [references omitted, paras. 19-20]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the conviction set 
aside, and an acquittal was entered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Unrecorded Confessions
“[T]he Crown bears the onus of 
establishing a sufficient record of the 
interaction between the suspect and the 
police. That onus may be readily satisfied 
by the use of audio, or better still, video 
recording. Indeed, it is my view that where the suspect is in 
custody, recording facilities are readily available, and the 
police deliberately set out to interrogate the suspect without 
giving any thought to the making of a reliable record, the 
context inevitably makes the resulting non-recorded 
interrogation suspect. In such cases, it will be a matter for 
the trial judge on the voir dire to determine whether or not 
a sufficient substitute for an audio or video tape record has 
been provided to satisfy the heavy onus on the Crown to 
prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ontario 
Court of Appeal, R. v. Moore-MacFarlane (2001) 
Dockets:C31374 and C30881 (OntCA) (para. 65)
Note-able Quote
“People are like stained-glass windows. They sparkle 
and shine when the sun is out, but when the darkness 
sets in, their true beauty is revealed only if there is 
a light from within”.—Elizabeth Kubler Ross
www.10-8.ca
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VIOLENCE TO ESCAPE THEFT 
NOT ROBBERY UNDER s.343(a) 
CRIMINAL CODE
R. v. Newell, 2007 NLCA 9
The accused entered a supermarket, 
placed a quantity of meat in a hand 
basket, and left the store without 
paying. A loss prevention officer saw 
the theft and touched the accused on the shoulder 
as he was entering a parking lot just outside the 
store.  The loss prevention officer identified himself  
and told the accused he would have to return to the 
store.  The accused spun around, dropped the basket 
of meat, and tussled with the loss prevention 
officer. The accused had a knife in one hand which 
he swung at the loss prevention officer who then 
backed off. The accused then ran away leaving the 
meat.
At trial in Newfoundland 
Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of 
robbery under s.343(a) of 
the Criminal Code.  The 
trial judge ruled that the 
violence used against the 
loss prevention officer was 
connected to the theft and 
part of an ongoing 
enterprise.
The accused then appealed to the Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that he should have 
been acquitted of robbery because he only 
committed a theft and did not use violence for the 
purposes prohibited under s.343(a). Justice 
Cameron, writing the decision of the Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal, agreed. The theft was completed 
before the violence or threats of violence was used 
against the loss prevention officer. Thus, the 
violence was not used to “overcome resistance to the 
stealing.” Using violence or threats of violence to 
enable a thief to escape does not elevate a 
completed theft into a robbery under s.343(a). 
Justice Cameron stated:
In this case, the Crown accepts that the theft 
was complete when the [accused] exited the 
store.   The violence cannot be said to be to 
overcome resistance to the theft.
I turn now to the trial judge’s view that the whole 
of the events prior to the [accused] running away 
were part of one seamless incident and though a 
theft might have been completed, for the purpose 
of s. 343(a) it was still ongoing when the tussle 
between [the loss prevention officer] and the 
[accused] took place.
Though one might find some support for this 
approach in English jurisprudence, as the 
discussion up to this point demonstrates it is not 
supported by the weight of Canadian authority.  
Further, the distinctions between s. 343(a) and 
(b) support the view that Parliament intended to 
preserve in (a) the traditional limitation that the 
violence had to be before or contemporaneous 
with the theft.   To conclude that a theft is 
complete for the purpose of s. 322 but not for 
the purpose of s. 343 runs counter to the fact 
that robbery is considered to be aggravated 
theft. [footnote omitted, paras. 30-32]
A conviction of theft was substituted for the 
robbery conviction. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Racial Profiling
“A police officer who uses race 
(consciously or subconsciously) as an 
indicator of potential unlawful conduct 
based not on any personalized suspicion, 
but on negative stereotyping that attributes 
propensity for unlawful conduct to individuals because of 
race is engaged in racial profiling. Racial profiling is wrong.  
It is wrong regardless of whether the police conduct that 
racial profiling precipitates could be justified apart from 
resort to negative stereotyping based on race.   For 
example, a police officer who sees a vehicle speeding and 
decides to pull the vehicle over in part because of the 
driver’s colour is engaged in racial profiling even though the 
speed of the vehicle could have justified the officer’s action. 
Police conduct that is the product of racial profiling and 
interferes with the constitutional rights of the target of the 
profiling gives rise to a cause of action under the Charter.”-
Justice Doherty, Ontario Court of Appeal, Peart & Grant v. 
Peel Regional Police et al, (2006) Docket:C40334 (OntCA) 
(references omitted, paras. 90-91)
s.343(a) Criminal Code
Every one commits 
robbery who steals, 
and for the purpose of 
extorting whatever is 
stolen or to prevent or 
overcome resistance 
to the stealing, uses 
violence or threats of 
violence to   a person 
or property.
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  RCMP FAST FACTS
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is 
Canada’s largest police organization. As 
of January 1, 2007 the force was 
24,578 strong, including 16,783 
police officers, 63 special 
constables, 2,978 civilian members 
and 4,626 public servants. As well, 
more than 75,000 volunteers assist 
the RCMP which is divided into four regions with 15 
divisions. (source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca)
CANADA’s LARGEST MUNICIPAL RCMP 
DETACHMENTS
Detachment Police Officers
Surrey BC 483
Burnaby BC 221
Richmond BC 173
Kelowna BC 134
Langley Township BC 125
Prince George BC 121
Coquitlam BC 120
Nanaimo BC 116
Kamloops BC 111
Red Deer AB 111
Source: Statistics Canada, 2006, Police Resources in 
Canada, Catalogue No:85-225-XIE
BC
5,355 AB
2,328
QC
962ON
1,310
SK
1,142
MN
909
NF
468
YK
116
NU
122NWT
171
NS
913
PEI
133
NB
862
RCMP ‘HQ’ & Training Academy 1,592
Source: Statistics Canada, 2006, 
Police Resources in Canada, 
Catalogue No:85-225-XIE
Region Division Area
North West D Manitoba
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
V Nunavut Territory
K Alberta
Depot Regina, Saskatchewan
Pacific E British Columbia
M Yukon Territory Region Division Area
Central A National Capital Region
O Ontario
C Quebec
Atlantic B Newfoundland
H Nova SCotia
J New Brunswick
L Prince Edward Island
Numbers under each 
provincial abbreviation 
indicate number of 
RCMP officers
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OFFENDER MUST SATISFY 
COURT THAT HOUSE SHOULD 
NOT BE FORFEITED
R. v. Siek, 2007 NSCA 23
Police executed a search warrant on a 
single story residence with a full 
basement and attached garage. They 
found a marihuana grow operation 
consisting of a total of 518 plants (279 mature 
plants and 239 plants in the cloning stage). There 
was no furniture in any of the rooms but a few 
blankets on the living room floor, clothing, and a 
telephone. Police found 180 marihuana clones under 
fluorescent lights in a bathroom. The master 
bedroom contained a ventilation system leading to a 
turbine on the roof, several boxes of florescent 
light tubes, and a number of growing pots.  Another 
bedroom served as a storage room for growing 
equipment and supplies such as fertilizers, grow 
material, and electrical equipment.   None of the 
bedrooms appeared to be occupied; only one 
contained any personal effects.
In the full basement, three of the four rooms had 
been converted into marihuana grow rooms, with high 
intensity lights, reflective shields, and ventilation 
systems.  In one room with 13 lights and shields, the 
police found boxes containing over nine kilograms of 
cannabis marihuana bud and over two kilograms of 
shake.  Another room contained an active grow of 61 
budding marihuana plants under 11 lights and shields.  
The third contained another 13 lights and shields 
over 118 pots filled with soil.  Ventilation flex tubing 
ran from the basement to the attic. Electricity had 
been diverted at the power mast on the main 
residence and on the garage, which had a separate 
power service.  The two-car garage housed over 200 
cannabis marihuana plants of different sizes (from 
clones to 18 inches tall) under two high intensity 
lights.  Turbines had been installed to provide fresh 
air and allow venting.
Police estimated the profit potential, if sold on a 
gram level, to be between $435,000 and $870,000 
and, if sold on a pound level, between $242,000 and 
$339,000.   Equipment (ballasts/condensers, 1000 
watt lights and reflective shields) was valued at 
$20,000, excluding the cost of the wiring, timers, 
Insignia      Rank # of 
Positions
 
Commissioner 1
 
Deputy Commissioner 6
 
Assistant Commissioner 26
 
Chief Superintendent 56
 
Superintendent 165
 
Inspector 360
 
Corps Sergeant Major 1
 
Sergeant Major 6
 
Staff Sergeant Major 6
 
Staff Sergeant 813
 
Sergeant 1,724
 
Corporal 3,109
Constable 10,510
Total 16,783
source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about/organi_e.htm, 
[accessed March 3, 2007]
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connection with the commission of a designated 
substance offence, or (c) that is intended for 
use for the purpose of committing a designated 
substance offence.” Offence related property 
includes any property, whether personal 
property or real property. Further, property 
becomes offence related property not because 
of its characteristics but because of the use 
made of it. Unless the property is real property 
or a dwelling house, the judge “shall” grant the 
forfeiture order. In other words, s.16 calls for 
presumptive forfeiture and the offence related 
property is automatically forfeited. 
2. Second, there are two types of property that 
can be saved from forfeiture; dwelling houses 
(s.19.1(4)) and real property (s.19.1(3)). In the 
case of real property, the judge must consider 
whether a forfeiture order would be 
disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the 
offence, the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the offence and the criminal 
record, if any, of the offender. If the real 
property is a dwelling house, the judge must also 
consider the impact of forfeiture on the 
offender’s immediate family. Under this second 
part of the analysis the offender bears the 
burden of persuading the court that forfeiture 
is disproportionate and should not be granted. If 
persuaded, the judge “may” decline to order 
forfeiture.
Justice Oland summarized the legislation as follows:
…s. 16.(1) applies only whenever an offender has 
been convicted of a designated substance offence, 
such as trafficking or production.  The Crown is not 
permitted to apply for forfeiture for offences 
such as simple possession of certain substances.  
That feature, in combination 
with the broad definition of 
offence-related property, 
indicates that Parliament 
intended that, once used in 
the commission of the more 
serious offences which come 
within the definition of a 
designated substance 
offence, property would be 
taken from the offender and 
forfeited to the Crown, 
unless specifically exempted.
pots, soil, nutrients and labour.   The Nova Scotia 
Power Corporation calculated the value of the 
electricity that had been diverted at over $5,500.
The accused pled guilty in Nova Scotia Provincial 
Court to unlawful production, possession for the 
purpose of trafficking, and fraudulent diversion of 
electricity. He was sentenced to two years in prison, 
imposed a $300 victim surcharge, prohibited from 
firearms, and ordered to forfeit the lights, shields, 
exhaust fans, electrical panels, ballasts, grow 
nutrients, and grow mix. However, the Crown’s 
application to forfeit the accused’s real (estate) 
property was rejected. The trial judge found the 
forfeiture of the property would be 
disproportionate. He emphasized that the accused 
had not made any profit from the illegal activity—
this was his first crop that had been seized, he used 
his legitimate earnings to purchase the property, and 
he had been sentenced to two years in prison. The 
Crown then appealed the denial of its forfeiture 
application to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.
Justice Oland, authoring the judgment of the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal, examined the legislation 
allowing for property forfeiture. Under s.16 of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) the 
Crown may make an application when a person is 
convicted of a designated substance offence to have 
“offence-related property” forfeited. If the judge 
is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that any 
property is offence-related property and that the 
offence was committed in relation to that property, 
the judge shall order the property forfeited. 
Justice Oland also noted there was a two-part 
analysis in determining whether real property can be 
forfeited. 
1. First, the Crown must persuade 
the judge that the property is 
“offence related property” and 
that the offence was 
committed in relation to that 
property. “Offence related 
property” is defined in s.2 of 
the CDSA as “any property…(a) 
by means of or in respect of 
which a designated substance 
offence is committed, (b) that 
is used in any manner in 
“[The CDSA] presumption in 
favour of forfeiture serves to 
emphasize that forfeiture is a 
consequence of the offender 
having chosen to use an asset in 
the commission of the offence 
and having purposely converted 
it into offence-related property.” 
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police executed the search warrant than anything 
else.  Had the grow operation not been discovered, 
it may have continued, and he would have had more 
time to sell the product.   The [accused’s] failure 
to have made a profit from his illegal activity was 
not a particularly significant consideration in 
making forfeiture disproportionate. 
Furthermore, the source of the monies the 
[accused] expended to establish the grow 
operation is not a factor of great consequence.  By 
his own admission, shortly after he acquired it, the 
[accused] converted the Property into a marijuana 
grow operation, and thus into an offence-related 
property.   Whether he used his own legitimate 
earnings, proceeds of crime, or another source of 
financing for its acquisition does not alter the fact 
that what he did to it made the Property subject 
to forfeiture, unless the court could be satisfied 
that the disproportionality test was met.  
Similarly, his loss of $20,000 that he spent for 
grow equipment, his repayment of $5,500 for the 
diverted electricity, and his having kept the 
mortgage and other payments current as long as 
he did, are not heavily significant considerations in 
determining disproportionality. [paras. 33-34]
In allowing the Crown’s appeal and ordering the 
forfeiture of the property Justice Oland concluded:
Having considered the factors set out in the 
disproportionality test, I turn finally to the impact 
of forfeiture of the Property upon the [accused].  
He would lose his considerable investment in the 
Property and the grow equipment, but any loss by 
way of forfeiture would be of his own doing by 
having chosen to convert it into offence-related 
property.   However, the [accused] would not be 
left homeless, as he had another place to live, and 
had a relatively good financial position and a strong 
employment history.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Surely the fact that a uniformed police officer is 
wearing his hair below his collar will make him no less 
identifiable as a policeman.”—Thurgood Marshall, 
former U.S. Supreme Court Justice
This feature of the legislative scheme relating to 
forfeiture in the C.D.S.A. is striking.  Once there 
is a finding that property constitutes offence-
related property, forfeiture will automatically 
follow, unless the property is real property and the 
offender can satisfy the court under s.19.1(3) that 
forfeiture would be disproportionate, having 
regard to the factors listed in that provision.  This 
presumption in favour of forfeiture serves to 
emphasize that forfeiture is a consequence of the 
offender having chosen to use an asset in the 
commission of the offence and having purposely 
converted it into offence-related property. 
That presumption is displaced only when, pursuant 
to s. 19.1(3), the offender satisfies the court that 
the impact of an order of forfeiture would be 
disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the 
offence, the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the offence and the criminal record, 
if any, of the offender.  The sentence imposed is 
not included in the factors to be considered by the 
court.   Nor does the C.D.S.A. provide that 
forfeiture of offence-related property is to be 
considered part of the punitive sanction. [paras. 
43-45]
In this case, the trial judge over-emphasized some 
matters, did not consider others, and considered one 
that was inappropriate. First, the sentence imposed 
was not a valid consideration in determining the 
disproportionality of forfeiture. “Forfeiture is a 
consequence of property having been converted into 
offence - related property,” said Justice 
Oland. “While part of the sentencing process, it is 
not part of the sentence itself.   It follows that 
forfeiture, if granted, should not affect the 
sentence imposed for the offence.   Similarly, the 
sentence should not be impacted by a forfeiture 
order.  Finally, it is not essential that forfeiture and 
sentencing be dealt with in the same hearing.”
Second, the trial judge over-emphasized the lack of 
profit and loss of equity in the property obtained by 
legal means. The Court sated:
In addition, after having heard evidence that the 
marihuana grow showed three distinct stages of 
production and that considerable time and money 
had been invested, the judge did not make any 
finding that the grow operation would close after 
only six to eight months as the [accused] had 
testified.   Thus the fact that the [accused] had 
not made any profit is more a function of when the 
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unanimous judgment the conviction was restored. 
The Court stated:
Read in light of the important statutory purpose 
of minimizing driver and passenger injuries 
resulting from car collisions, the words “drives on 
a highway”, in our view, do not render the seat belt 
requirement inapplicable to the situation of 
drivers waiting at red traffic lights.   Such an 
interpretation would be inconsistent with the 
purpose of this statutory provision.   Accidents 
occur even when vehicles are stopped at traffic 
lights.  In our view, s. 106(3) must be interpreted 
as requiring the driver to wear a seat belt 
continuously from the time he or she puts the 
vehicle in motion on the highway to the time the 
driver leaves the highway, parks the vehicle in a 
position in which the vehicle can be left 
unattended, or gets out of the vehicle. [para. 8]
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
MUSCULAR POWER v. MUSCULAR 
STRENGTH: THE BIGGER THEY 
ARE, THE HARDER THE FALL?
Insp. Kelly Keith
Atlantic Police Academy
Why is it that some big bodybuilder 
types can’t punch their way out of 
a wet paper bag?  How is it that a 
person who can bench press 350 
pounds for 10 reps can’t punch harder 
than the person who can bench 200 lbs for one rep?  
The difference is that one possess muscular 
strength, the other muscular power or otherwise 
known as speed strength.
I believe it is more important for a Police Officer to 
be able to produce force in a brief amount of time 
than it is to move an object with maximal force.  
More often than not, police officers are 
spontaneously assaulted; a suspect quickly lunges at 
the officer. 
Since this is a physical fitness article, the officer 
safety issue of reactionary gap, will be left aside.  
When a suspect lunges at an officer with intent to 
assault, the suspect will either try to strike the 
officer or throw them to the ground.  Just as in 
cycling where there are spinners (aerobic) or 
grinders (muscular), in fighting there are generally 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Grounds - Arrest
There is a lawful arrest when a police 
officer subjectively believes that there are 
grounds to do so, and those grounds are 
objectively reasonable.  The totality of the 
circumstances relied upon by the arresting 
officer will form the basis for the objective assessment.  It 
would constitute an error in law to assess each fact or 
observation in isolation.   An objective assessment will 
include the dynamics within which the police officer acted, 
and his or her experience. - Ontario Court of Appeal, R. v. 
Lawes, 2007 ONCA 10 (para. 4)
PARKING AT RED LIGHT STILL 
DRIVING
York v. Tassone, 2007 ONCA 215
A police officer saw the accused in the 
driver’s seat of his car approach a red 
light. He illuminated the car and saw 
the accused was not wearing his seat 
belt. The accused then pulled the belt across his 
body, but was charged with failing to wear a seatbelt 
under s.106(3) of Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act. 
At trial the accused said he was driving the car, but 
put it in park and took off his seatbelt for 15-20 
seconds to check for his wallet at the red light. 
After finding his wallet he put his seat belt back on 
and went through the intersection. 
The Justice of the Peace accepted the accused’s 
testimony but found it did not constitute a defence 
to the charge. He found the accused was still 
operating and driving a motor vehicle on a highway 
even though he stopped at the red light and put his 
car in park. The accused was convicted. 
The accused successfully appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Justice. The appeal judge found the 
definition of “drive” to imply movement of the 
vehicle at the time of driving. Although the accused 
had care and control of the vehicle, the appeal judge 
ruled he was not driving the car. The conviction was 
quashed and a new trial was ordered. 
The York Regional Municipality appealed the judge’s 
decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal. In a 
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minimize the time in the rest position (ie. on the 
ground).
Instead of simply going for a run, attempt to train 
your body for functional police training by doing wind 
sprints.  This type of cardio training is far more 
functional for a police officer than just going for a 
run.  It is not very often police officers chase a 
suspect for two to five miles at a steady jog pace.  
Just as with weights you can combine this type of 
training with your regular runs that you already 
enjoy.  You can alternate running days, where you do 
wind sprints on one day and then long steady runs on 
the next or split your runs up where for the first 
half is a paced run, and the second half is built 
around wind sprints. 
There is one caution about muscular power/speed 
strength training.  When you quickly drive a weight 
through a range of motion, you must also have the 
ability to stop that inertia.  This does put strain on 
your body.  Although your goal is to move the weight 
through the range of motion as fast as you can, it 
must also be done with control in mind.  However, 
once your body adapts to this type of training, your 
performance injuries will be greatly reduced since 
your body is able to withstand the inertia of a real 
attack.
       ‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (b) Deputy Commissioner —see p. 17 of this 
publication.
2. (b) False—see R. v. Suberu (at p. 4 of this 
publication). 
3. (a) True—see R. v. Lewis (at p. 7 of this 
publication). 
4. (a) True—see R. v. Philogene (at p. 13 of this 
publication). 
5. (d)  suicide—see  p.10-11  of this publication. 
6.  (b) False—see R. v. Lewis (at p. 7 of this 
publication).
Note-able Quote
“I don't measure a man's success by how high he 
climbs but how high he bounces when he hits 
bottom”.—General George S. Patton
strikers or grapplers.  If the striker lunges at an 
officer, the officer with muscular power/speed 
strength will be able to strike fast and hard, thus 
creating space to enable time to get to their 
intermediate weapons.  
The officer with muscular strength will need to get 
a hold of the suspect to be able to convert his 
strength into a positive attribute.  If the suspect 
grabs a hold of the officer, the officer with 
muscular power/speed strength is able to quickly 
defeat the grab by displacing the suspect’s balance. 
They can quickly use their power to pull the suspect 
to one side or the other, displacing balance.  The 
officer with muscular strength will do well if the 
suspect is simply attempting to out muscle the 
officer to the ground.  However, if the suspect is 
using quick pushing and pulling motions to grapple 
with the officer then muscular strength will not be 
optimized.
The good news is that the police officer that has 
been working on their muscular strength and 
neglecting muscular power can make some small 
changes and quickly get access to the muscular 
power/speed strength.
The key to developing muscular power/speed 
strength is applying speed to the desired movement.  
In other words, when doing the bench press you will 
generally have to take a couple plates off the bar. 
Your goal now will be to press the bar as fast as you 
can through the range of motion the bar travels.  You 
can split your sets up and perform two sets of 
muscular strength bench presses and then two sets 
of muscular power/speed strength sets.  This can be 
done for almost every exercise you do.  If you’re 
doing wide grip chin ups, attempt to move your body 
through the range of motion as fast as you can.  The 
two exercises that are best known for developing 
power are Olympic lifts (cleans and snatches).  By 
muscular power/speed strength training you will 
train your muscles to utilize the strength you have 
already built in a functional manner.
Plyometric exercises are an excellent way to 
increase muscular power/speed strength.  This type 
of exercising does not require a lot of equipment. In 
fact most are body weight exercises, medicine balls, 
or steps.  The key to plyometric exercises is to 
maximize the force through the range of motion, and 
www.10-8.ca22
Volume 7 Issue 2
March/April 2007
Traffic Act when an emergency vehicle approaches 
and this explanation for his behaviour (mistaking the 
police vehicle for an ambulance) was as equally valid 
as him being impaired when he drove the way he did. 
Since the officer did not take this explanation into 
account the officer lacked the necessary objective 
reasonable grounds for the breath demand. The trial 
judge excluded the certificate of analysis and the 
accused was acquitted of all charges. The Crown’s 
appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
was dismissed.
The Crown then appealed to the Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the 
appeal judge erred in upholding the decision of the 
trial judge. Justice Sherstobitoff, with Justice Lane 
concurring, ruled the officer did have reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe the accused’s ability 
to drive was impaired by alcohol. In assessing 
whether a police officer has reasonable and 
probable grounds it is not required that the officer 
demonstrates anything more than reasonable and 
probable grounds. For example, the officer is not 
required to establish a prima facie case for 
conviction. Further, a non-expert witness, here a 
police officer, is entitled to give opinion evidence 
that a person is impaired even though it may be 
difficult for them to narrate factual observations 
separately. In this case, the trial judge did not 
properly consider the 20 year veteran’s opinion. As 
for the explanation offered by the accused for not 
pulling over, Justice Sherstobitoff stated:
Finally, the trial judge seems to have placed a 
great deal of weight on the evidence that the 
[accused] thought that the police vehicle was an 
ambulance. However, assuming the explanation to 
be true, it explained nothing. It did 
not explain the red eyes, the smell 
of alcohol, or his lethargic and 
slack-jawed appearance. It did not 
explain the traffic violations. In 
particular, it did not explain why he 
kept driving for three kilometers 
at a high rate of speed while a 
vehicle with emergency lights 
flashing followed his every move. 
After one or two lane changes, it 
must have been apparent to the 
[accused] that the following vehicle was not trying 
to get him to get out of the way. The normal 
reaction of a normal thinking person would be to 
POLICE NEED NOT 
DEMONSTRATE MORE THAN 
REASONABLE GROUNDS
R. v. Shepherd, 2007 SKCA 29
In the early morning hours a police 
officer driving a marked SUV saw the 
accused’s vehicle fail to stop for a 
stop sign and then speed 20 to 25 
km/h above the 50 km/h speed limit. The officer 
activated the lights and siren to pull the vehicle 
over. The vehicle moved to the right and slowed 
down, but then sped up over the speed limit. The 
vehicle repeatedly made the same manoeuvre over a 
three kilometer route. The vehicle eventually came 
to a stop and the accused was arrested for failing to 
stop. 
While making the arrest the officer smelled an 
odour of alcohol and noted the accused had red eyes, 
appeared lethargic, fatigued, “slack-jawed”, and 
made slow and deliberate movements. The accused 
said he failed to stop because he thought the vehicle 
behind him with flashing lights was an ambulance. 
The officer concluded the accused was impaired and 
made a breath demand. He was taken back to the 
police station where he was subsequently charged 
with evading a peace officer, impaired driving, and 
over 80mg%. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused argued his rights under s.8 (unreasonable 
search and seizure) and s.9 (arbitrary detention) of 
the Charter were violated because the officer 
lacked reasonable and probable grounds to demand a 
breath sample and therefore the certificate of 
analysis should be excluded. 
Although the trial judge 
found the officer 
subjectively had reasonable 
and probable grounds to 
make the breath demand, 
there were not objectively 
reasonable grounds for 
concluding the accused’s 
ability to operate a motor 
vehicle was impaired by alcohol. The trial judge held 
that the accused complied with the statutory 
requirements under Saskatchewan’s Highway 
s.67(8) Highway Traffic Act  (Saskatchewan)
Unless otherwise directed by a peace officer, the 
driver of a vehicle on a highway shall, when 
approached by an emergency vehicle sounding 
an emergency device or operating an emergency 
light, immediately drive as close as possible to the 
right-hand edge of the highway and shall not 
enter the next intersection until the emergency 
vehicle has passed.
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move to the right of the road and stop before any 
intersection so as to allow the following vehicle to 
pass, irrespective of the fact that that was what 
the law (ss. 67(8) of The Highway Traffic Act...) 
required him to do. In my view, any reasonable 
person would view the [accused’s] entire driving 
behaviour as tending to show that the [accused] 
was behaving abnormally and thus a possible sign 
of impairment by alcohol. This behaviour, when 
combined with the subsequent observations of the 
officer respecting the smell of alcohol the red 
eyes, and the lethargic and deliberate movements, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that 
the [accused’s] ability to drive was probably 
impaired by alcohol, using the now generally 
accepted standard respecting what constitutes 
impairment set out in R. v. Stellato, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 
478… [para. 12]
Justice Lane, in his concurring reasons, pointed out 
that the trial judge misunderstood the statutory 
requirements imposed on a driver on the approach of 
an emergency vehicle under the Highway Traffic 
Act. The Act requires a driver pull over to the right 
and not to enter the next intersection until the 
emergency vehicle has passed. In this case the 
pursuit lasted three kilometers and each time the 
accused pulled over the police vehicle pulled over 
behind him. The police vehicle never passed the 
accused and he continued through intersections. 
Justice Lane therefore concluded that the accused’s 
explanation for his driving could not be 
characterized as reasonable as was found by the 
trial judge. 
Justice Smith, in dissent, concluded the trial judge 
was justified in concluding the officer’s belief was 
not objectively reasonable and that there was no 
basis for an appellate court to interfere with this 
finding.
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“The leadership instinct you are born with is the 
backbone. You develop the funny bone and the 
wishbone that go with it”.—Elaine Agather
CARE & CONTROL INCLUDES 
RISK OF INADVERTENTLY 
SETTING VEHICLE IN MOTION
R. v. Buckingham, 2007 SKCA 32
The accused had driven his employer’s 
truck to a bar and after a night of 
drinking decided he should take a taxi 
home. After waiting unusually long for 
a cab, he chose to enter the truck to keep warm; he 
was not warmly dressed and the evening was cold. He 
started the truck, turned on the heater, depressed 
the accelerator to hasten the warming, but fell 
asleep over the wheel. 
About 10 to 15 minutes later the police found the 
accused asleep over the wheel, motor revving with 
the automatic transmission in park. The officer did 
not note whether the emergency brake was on. The 
officer turned off the engine, shook the accused 
awake, and noted he was unfocused and confused. He 
was slow to follow directions, almost fell getting out 
of the truck, staggered, had red blood-shot eyes, 
very slurred speech, and displayed a strong odour of 
alcohol. The officer gave the breath demand and two 
samples were subsequently obtained, 260mg% and 
270mg%. He was charged with impaired care and 
control and care and control over 80mg%. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
evidence was that before the vehicle could drive, the 
driver would need to step on the brake and shift the 
transmission into drive by pulling it towards the 
driver and then pushing it downward. The trial judge 
ruled that the accused was not in care and control of 
the vehicle. The accused did not intend to drive the 
vehicle, but rather was going to take a taxi home. 
The vehicle was parked off the street in a parking 
lot on level grade and there was no danger that he 
would intentionally or inadvertently set the vehicle 
in motion. The accused was acquitted of both 
charges. An appeal by Crown to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Queen’s Bench was dismissed. 
The Crown then appealed to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal. Justice Smith, writing the opinion 
of the Court, examined what care and control means. 
In this case, the Crown conceded that the 
presumption of care and control due to an accused’s 
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occupancy of the driver’s seat under s.258(1)(a) of 
the Criminal Code did not apply because the accused 
credibly testified that he did not intend to drive. 
However, a person can nonetheless be in “defacto” 
care and control if there is a risk they could set the 
vehicle in motion, despite no intention to drive. 
Justice Smith found that acts short of actual 
driving can constitute care and control under s.253 
of the Criminal Code and that an intention to drive is 
not an essential element of the offence. The 
Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Toews, [1985] 2 
S.C.R. 119, described care and control as follows:
…[a]cts of care or control, short of driving, are 
acts which involve some use of the car or its 
fittings and equipment, or some course of conduct 
associated with the vehicle which would involve a 
risk of putting the vehicle in motion so that it 
could become dangerous. Each case will depend on 
its own facts and the circumstances in which acts 
of care or control may be found will vary widely. 
There are two aspects to the risk associated with 
whether the accused’s use of the vehicle’s “fittings 
and equipment” (starting the engine to turn on the 
heater) together with his state of 
intoxication created the risk that 
the vehicle could be set in motion 
thereby creating a danger to the 
public. 
1. the intoxicated accused will 
awaken and be too intoxicated 
to remember or adhere to his 
previous decision not to drive. 
With respect to this aspect, 
the trial judge concluded the 
accused would not change his 
mind or forget his decision not 
to drive. It was his past 
practice to call a taxi when he had been drinking 
and that he did not drive the company vehicle 
while intoxicated. Justice Smith agreed it was 
entirely appropriate for the trial judge to 
consider the accused’s intention not to drive in 
this context.
2. in their intoxicated state they will inadvertently 
set the vehicle in motion. With respect to this 
aspect, the trial judge commented that it would 
take two motions to put the vehicle in drive 
(depress the brake and pull the gear lever 
forward and down) and that it was parked off 
the road on a flat surface. Although it was 
proper for the trial judge to consider this in his 
risk assessment, Justice Smith concluded the 
trial judge paid too little attention to the fact 
that the accused had started the engine and was 
exerting pressure on the accelerator to rev it 
when he was discovered. Justice Smith said:
…This was a significant use of the vehicle’s 
fittings and equipment by an individual in a 
highly intoxicated state, and one that 
necessarily enhanced both the risk that the 
vehicle could inadvertently be set in motion, 
and the risk that if he awoke, he might 
intentionally set the vehicle in motion, given 
his intoxicated state. However small those 
risks were, they were not negligible, and the 
realization of those risks was considerably 
more likely as a result of the motor being 
activated than it would otherwise have been. 
It is just this creation of risk that s. 253 of 
the Code is intended to address. [para. 19]
Justice Smith, however, would not accept the 
Crown’s submission that turning 
on a vehicle’s engine ipso facto
amounts to care and control in all 
cases. In this circumstances of 
this case, the vehicle was in a 
public parking lot, was not 
disabled in any way, and “starting 
the engine running was sufficient 
to establish care and control of 
the vehicle for the purpose of 
these provisions of the Criminal 
Code.”
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, 
the accused’s acquittal was set 
aside, a conviction for over 80mg% was substituted, 
and the matter was remitted back to Saskatchewan 
Provincial Court for sentencing.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“The idea that the police cannot ask questions of the 
person that knows most about the crime is an 
infamous decision”.—Edwin Meese III
“[a]cts of care or control, short 
of driving, are acts which 
involve some use of the car or 
its fittings and equipment, or 
some course of conduct 
associated with the vehicle 
which would involve a risk of 
putting the vehicle in motion so 
that it could become 
dangerous.”
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Supreme Court judge dismissed the proceedings as 
an abuse of process because the lawyer intended to 
use the criminal process to express her political 
views. 
The lawyer then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that 
the Provincial Court judge erred in finding President 
Bush had head of state immunity from the charges 
and that the Supreme Court justice erred in finding 
the charges were an abuse of process. The Crown 
objected to the appeal submitting, in part, that the 
Court had no jurisdiction to hear it because the 
lawyer had not obtained the consent of the Attorney 
General to continue the proceedings. 
Justice Levine, authoring the opinion of the Court 
agreed with the Crown. Although s.7 of the Criminal 
Code allows a person to be charged with acts of 
torture occurring outside Canada, if the person is 
not a Canadian citizen the consent of the Attorney 
General must be obtained within eight 
days after proceedings are commenced. 
Proceedings are commenced upon the 
laying an information, as suggested by the 
Crown, and not when a summons or warrant 
is issued, as argued by the lawyer. 
Since the lawyer failed to obtain the 
consent of the Attorney General to 
continue the proceedings, the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal did not have the jurisdiction to continue 
the appeal. The Crown’s application to dismiss the 
appeal was granted and the appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
OFFICER CONVICTED OF 
OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE FOR 
NOT TAKING BREATH SAMPLES
R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5
The accused, a police sergeant, set off 
in pursuit of a minivan followed by two 
constables after the vehicle was seen 
coming towards them making a strange 
noise—it had a flat tire. The vehicle was speeding, 
ran a stop sign, and almost hit a median. The minivan 
was finally stopped and the driver did not respond to 
instructions, instead banging his head on the wheel. 
BUSH TORTURE CHARGES A 
NULLITY
Davidson v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General) 
2006 BCCA 447
On November 30, 2004, the same day 
U.S. President George Bush was in 
Ottawa at the invitation of the 
Government of Canada, a lawyer 
attended before a Justice of the Peace and swore a 
private information under s.504 of the Criminal Code
alleging that President Bush committed crimes of 
torture between February 2002 and November 2004 
in the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, Iraq and the 
U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Under 
s.7(3.7)(e) of the Criminal Code a person can be 
charged with acts of torture or counseling torture 
even if the acts were committed outside Canada if 
the person is present in Canada after the commission 
of the offence. If 
the person is not a 
Canadian citizen, 
consent must be 
obtained from 
Canada’s Attorney 
General to continue 
the proceedings.
When a private information is laid, the Justice of 
the Peace who receives the information must refer 
it to a Provincial Court judge to consider whether to 
compel the accused’s appearance. The lawyer applied 
for a Provincial Court hearing, but had not received 
the consent of the Attorney General to prosecute 
President Bush. The Crown applied to the Provincial 
Court judge to have the charges declared a nullity, 
arguing President Bush enjoyed head of state 
immunity from criminal prosecution in Canada. The 
judge agreed and declared the information a nullity 
and directed no further proceedings take place. 
The lawyer filed an application in British Columbia 
Supreme Court seeking an order quashing the ruling 
of the Provincial Court judge that the information 
was a nullity. The Crown argued the proceedings 
were moot and the court did not have jurisdiction 
because the Attorney General’s consent to continue 
the proceedings had not been obtained. The 
s.7(7) Criminal Code
If the accused is not a Canadian citizen, no 
proceedings in respect of which courts have 
jurisdiction by virtue of this section shall be 
continued unless the consent of the Attorney 
General of Canada is obtained not later than 
eight days after the proceedings are commenced.
www.10-8.ca26
Volume 7 Issue 2
March/April 2007
The driver was crying and talking in a confused 
manner. He got out of the vehicle, threw himself on 
the ground, and identified himself as a police 
officer. The officers could smell alcohol on him.
The driver was taken to the police station by the 
constables and the sergeant requested the 
occurrence be classified as an assist public. The 
sergeant spoke to the driver back at the police 
station and offered to take him to the hospital, but 
he refused. The sergeant decided to put the driver 
in a youth detention room to calm him down. At this 
time the sergeant saw the driver staggering and 
formed the opinion that he had reasonable grounds 
to believe he had committed the offence of impaired 
driving. He decided not to make a breath demand, 
instead claiming the driver was depressed and 
needed treatment. The sergeant also told one of the 
constables to use “unclassified activity” as the 
occurrence code. 
When later asked by his superior where the impaired 
driving report and breathalyzer results were, the 
sergeant said he exercised his discretion and 
decided not to arrest or demand breath samples. 
The superior demanded a written impaired driving 
report which was subsequently submitted. 
The sergeant was charged with obstructing justice 
under s.139(2) of the Criminal Code for deliberately 
failing to gather evidence needed to lay criminal 
charges against a suspect who he had reasonable 
grounds to believe was driving while intoxicated. At 
trial in the Court of Quebec the judge noted that 
the Crown needed to prove more than a breach of 
ethics, inappropriate or 
unprofessional conduct, 
or an error in judgment. 
Rather, Crown needed 
to prove the accused 
had the specific intent 
to obstruct, pervert, or 
defeat the course of 
justice when he chose 
not to administer a 
breathalyzer test even 
though he had 
reasonable grounds to 
believe he was an 
impaired driver. 
As for the sergeant’s exercise of discretion, the 
trial judge recognized that law enforcement and the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system 
requires it be exercised on a daily basis. However, it 
must be exercised honestly and not arbitrarily, out 
of favouritism, or with any other dishonest 
intention. In this case, the judge found the accused 
did not have the driver take the breathalyzer test 
and deliberately failed to perform his duty,  giving 
the driver preferential treatment because he was a 
police officer, not because he had a mental health 
concern. The accused was convicted. The accused’s 
appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal was 
unsuccessful. He then appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.
Justice Charron, authoring the 5:4 majority 
judgment for the Supreme Court of Canada first 
examined police discretion and its relationship to the 
offence of obstructing justice:
There is no question that police officers have a 
duty to enforce the law and investigate crimes.  
The principle that the police have a duty to 
enforce the criminal law is well established at 
common law…
Moreover this principle is codified in section 48 
of [Quebec’s] Police Act…
Nevertheless, it should not be concluded 
automatically, or without distinction, that this 
duty is applicable in every situation.  Applying the 
letter of the law to the practical, real-life 
situations faced by police officers in performing 
their everyday duties requires that certain 
adjustments be made.   Although these 
adjustments may sometimes 
appear to deviate from the letter 
of the law, they are crucial and 
are part of the very essence of 
the proper administration of the 
criminal justice system, or to use 
the words of s.  139(2), are 
perfectly consistent with the 
“course of justice”.  The ability —
  indeed the duty —  to use one’s 
judgment to adapt the process of 
law enforcement to individual 
circumstances and to the real-life 
demands of justice is in fact the 
basis of police discretion.   What 
La  Forest  J. said in R. v. Beare, 
“[A] police officer who has 
reasonable grounds to believe that 
an offence has been committed, or 
that a more thorough investigation 
might produce evidence that could 
form the basis of a criminal charge, 
may exercise his or her discretion to 
decide not to engage the judicial 
process.  But this discretion is not 
absolute.  Far from having carte 
blanche, police officers must justify 
their decisions rationally.”
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The required justification is essentially twofold.  
First,  the exercise of the discretion must be 
justified subjectively, that is, the discretion must 
have been exercised honestly and transparently, 
and on the basis of valid and reasonable grounds…  
Thus, a decision based on favouritism, or on 
cultural, social or racial stereotypes, cannot 
constitute a proper exercise of police discretion.  
However, the officer’s sincere belief that he 
properly exercised his discretion is not sufficient 
to justify his decision.
Hence, the exercise of police discretion must also 
be justified on the basis of objective factors.  I 
agree…that in determining whether a decision 
resulting from an exercise of police discretion is 
proper, it is important to consider the material 
circumstances in which the discretion was 
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, at p. 410, is directly on point 
here:
Discretion is an essential feature of the 
criminal justice system.  A system that 
attempted to eliminate discretion would 
be unworkably complex and rigid.
Thus, a police officer who has reasonable grounds 
to believe that an offence has been committed, or 
that a more thorough investigation might produce 
evidence that could form the basis of a criminal 
charge, may exercise his or her discretion to 
decide not to engage the judicial process.  But this 
discretion is not absolute.  Far from having carte 
blanche, police  officers must justify their 
decisions rationally.
POLICE DISCRETION & OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE
R. v. Beaudry (SCC)
Stage 1: Was there a proper exercise of police discretion?
Yes No 
The discretion was exercised honesty and 
justified on the basis of objective factors 
(what would a reasonable police officer 
do in the same situation?).
The discretion was exercised dishonesty or 
corruptly (eg, a decision based on 
favouritism or cultural, social, or racial 
stereotypes). 
Inquiry ends:
No need to proceed further  Proceed to Stage 2 
Stage 2: Was the offence of obstructing justice committed?
Did the accused intend to act in a way tending to obstruct, pervert, or defeat the 
course of justice?
A simple error of judgment is not enough for conviction.
Not exercising legitimate discretion but acting in good faith in not enough for conviction. 
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in fact intend to act in a way tending to obstruct, 
pervert or defeat the course of justice.  A simple 
error of judgment will not be enough.  An accused 
who acted in good faith, but whose conduct 
cannot be characterized as a legitimate exercise 
of the discretion, has not committed the criminal 
offence of obstructing justice. [references 
omitted, para. 52]
In upholding the accused’s conviction, Justice 
Charron noted a number of factors. First, the off-
duty police officer was driving while in an advanced 
state of intoxication. He was speeding on a public 
roadway with a flat tire, failed to make a stop, and 
just missed a median. He then fled from police 
before eventually bringing his vehicle to a stop. 
Then, after pulling over, he ignored the sergeant for 
several minutes, sat with his head down on the 
wheel, cried, spoke in a confused manner, and fell 
down when he got out of his vehicle. The sergeant 
did not attempt to conceal an offence but decided 
not to gather evidence (obtain breath samples) that 
would have been needed to lay criminal charges 
under s.253. Here, the trial judge found the 
sergeant acted knowingly and did not take timely 
breath samples out of favouritism—because the 
impaired river was a police officer—and not because 
he was worried about the driver’s health. The trial 
judge’s conclusion that the sergeant acted out of 
favouritism and had the specific intent to obstruct, 
pervert, or defeat the course of justice by not 
taking breath samples was reasonable . 
Justice Fish, writing the four member dissenting 
judgment, found the trial judge’s reasons for 
conviction were flawed in the evaluation and analysis 
of the evidence including whether the accused had 
acted corruptly or dishonestly with the intent to 
obstruct justice. Justice Fish would have ordered a 
new trial rather than entering an acquittal because 
there was evidence that, if properly weighed and 
considered, could reasonably have supported a 
conviction. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
Note-able Quote
“Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves. 
What is equally true is that every community gets 
the kind of law enforcement it insists on”.—Robert 
exercised.   However, I do not agree…on the 
importance of the factors [of the administrative 
directives and the administration of justice in the 
province be regarded as part of the legal 
context]. [references omitted, paras. 35-39] 
In assessing the importance of the material 
circumstances as factors affecting police decision 
making, Justice Charon stated:
First, it is self-evident that the material 
circumstances are an important factor in the 
assessment of a police officer’s decision: the 
discretion will certainly not be exercised in the 
same way in a case of shoplifting by a teenager as 
one involving a robbery.   In the first case, the 
interests of justice may very well be served if the 
officer gives the young offender a stern warning 
and alerts his or her parents.  However, this does 
not mean that the police have no discretion left 
when the degree of seriousness reaches a certain 
level.  In the case of a robbery, or an even more 
serious offence, the discretion can be exercised 
to decide not to arrest a suspect or not to pursue 
an investigation.   However, the justification 
offered must be proportionate to the seriousness 
of the conduct and it must be clear that the 
discretion was exercised in the public interest.  
Thus, while some exercises of discretion are 
almost routine and are clearly justified, others 
are truly exceptional and will require that the 
police officer explain his or her decision in 
greater detail. [para. 40]
In determining whether the offence of obstructing 
justice was committed with respect to the exercise 
of police discretion the court must first look at 
whether the discretion was exercised honestly and 
also whether it could be justified on the basis of 
objective factors—What would a police officer 
acting reasonably in the same situation do? This 
analysis should be linked to the actus reus of the 
offence. 
If it is found that the conduct in issue is not a 
proper exercise of police discretion, then it must be 
determined whether the offence of obstructing 
justice has been committed. Justice Charron stated:
To sum up, the actus reus of the offence will be 
established only if the act tended to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice.  With respect to 
mens rea, it is not in dispute that this is a specific 
intent offence.   The prosecution must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did 
